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lNrnRNATIONAL LA.w-lMMUNITY OF EMPLOYEE OF UmTBD NATIONS DELEGATION FROM IN REM PROCEEDINGS IN MumcIPAL CoURTs-A landlord's summary proceeding for recovery of possession was brought in a New York municipal court against a secretary of the Argentine delegation to the United Nations.
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The defendant appeared specially and moved to vacate the service of the precept, claiming immunity from suit by virtue of the grant of diplomatic privileges
and immunities to official employees of member delegations under Article V of
the Headquarters Agreement1 between the United States and the United
Nations. Held, motion denied. Realty not directly pertaining to a delegation's
employee's official position is not removed from the jurisdiction of the local
courts by the grant of diplomatic immunity. Agostini v. De Antueno, (N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1950) 99 N.Y.S. (2d) 245.
Under generally recognized principles of international law, accredited diplomatic representatives are not subject to the criminal or civil jurisdiction of the
courts of the receiving state.2 This exemption is actually two-fold; acts in the
exercise of official diplomatic functions are protected by being imputed to the
sending state, while unofficial conduct is protected by diplomatic immunity in
order to insure a free and unhindered fulfillment of the official functions. 8
There is, however, no compelling obligation under customary international law
principles requiring an extension of such immunity to the personnel4 of public
international organizations. Consequently, United States municipal law has
failed to recognize any jurisdictional immunity in United Nations' representatives and employees, except as to official acts, 6 in the absence of express statutory- •
or treaty-granted exemptions.6 To meet this deficiency in the local law of the
host nation, the Headquarters Agreement7 grants diplomatic immunity to representatives to the United Nations and their staffs, the defendant in the principal
case belonging to the latter category. The Agreement, in order to avert local
interference with the independence of operation necessary for the fulfillment
. of international obligations, creates a privileged class of persons ostensibly beyond
61 Stat. L. 756, art. V, §15 (1947).
2 HYDE, hmmNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., §§435-438 (1945); 4 HAcxwoRTH, DIGEST
oF lNTERNATIONAL LAw, §§400-405 (1942).
3 Preuss, "Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities,"
10 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. REv. 170 (1933); OGDON, BAsEs oF DrPLoMATic IMMmmY, 166194 (1936); Harvard Institute of International Law, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities," 26 AM. J. INT. L. 23, ll8, 700 (1932 Supp.).
4 The references made to "United Nations personnel" and "United Nations functionaries" in this article are meant to include both persons employed by the United Nations
organization and persons serving member delegations to the United Nations. The defendant
in the principal case belongs to this latter category.
5 Official acts are immune not because of diplomatic immunity, but rather because they
are the authorized acts of an agent of an immune principal, the United Nations. Preuss,
"Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of Agents Invested With Functions of an International Interest," 25 AM. J. INT. L. 694 at 706 (1931); Kunz, ''Privileges and Immunities of
International Organizations," 41 AM. J. INT. L. 828 at 838 (1947). It is interesting to
observe that the United Nations Charter does not spell out any greater immunity than that
for official acts. See art. 105 of the Charter, the text of which can be found in 59 Stat. L.
1032 (1945).
6 Preuss, ''The International Organizations Immunity Act," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 332
at 333 (1946), discussing the effect of the Immunities Act, 59 Stat. L. 669 (1945), 22
U.S.C. (1946) §288d; Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations,"
41 AM. J. INT. L. 828 at 842-6 (1947); United States v. Coplon, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 84
F. Supp. 472 at 476.
1 61 Stat. L. 756, art. V, §15 (1947).
1
2
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the reach of legal process. In meeting this problem of enforcement of legal rights
against United Nations personnel, there are at least four approaches which could
be adopted: (1) judicial machinery could be established within the international
organization itself;8 (2) the immunity might be waived by the organization upon
application;9 (3) each nation could retain exclusive jurisdiction over its own
nationals for such purposes; 10 or (4) the local courts might exercise jurisdiction
subject to the defense that an official function is involved. 11 The New York
court apparently adopts the fourth approach,1 2 although the grant of diplomatic
immunity would seem to deny such an assumption of jurisdiction. The reasoning of the court, however, raises the question of whetl1er in rem proceedings13
may not be an exception to diplomatic immunity. While there seems to be no
substantial authority for such an exception,14 it could be argued that personal
immunities should not prevail when the proceeding is basically against the property rather tlian the person. The inclusion of freedom from service of process---which is a requisite of even the in rem proceeding-within the scope of
diplomatic immunities15 causes this argument to lose its force. Despite this
difficulty, it is submitted that the court's "in rem" doctrine, as limited to proceedings involving the private property of United Nations functionaries, 16 has
a firm basis in general policy grounded on the necessities of the situation. In
rem proceedings are by definition within the exclusive jurisdiction of the local
courts, since jurisdiction over the property in dispute is an essential element.17
As a result, foreign courts are under the disability of being unable to enforce
s While such judicial machinery is certainly desirable [55 YALE L.J. 778 at 787
(1946)], there does not appear to be any immediate prospect for its establishment.
9 HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PlUVILEGES oF !N.raRNATIONAL OFFICIALS (1947), gives a
summary of the League of Nations experience with this approach. The Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1 U.N. TREATY SERIES 15, art. IV,
§14 and art. V, §20, shows that the United Nations has also adopted this procedure.
10 Foreign diplomatic agents have always been subject to the jurisdiction of their own
national courts. 1 OPPENHEIM-LAuTERPACHT, lNrERNATIONAL LAW, 7th ed., 715, 734
(1948). The Swiss government made this distinction as to the immunity of the personnel
of the League of Nations. HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PlUVILEGES OF !N.raRNATIONAL OFFICIALS (1947); Preuss, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of Agents Invested With
Functions of an International Interest," 25 AM. J. INT. L. 694 (1931).
11 This view was taken by the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat.
L. 669, 22 U.S.C. (1946) §288d. See Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 332 (1946). Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations,'' 41 AM. J. INT. L. 828 at 862 (1947), criticizes this approach.
12 See the holding in the principal case.
13 "In rem" as used in this article includes both in rem and quasi in rem proceedings.
14 See 2 HYDE, !N.raRNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., §437 (1945), to the effect that a diplomat's property is probably immune from local jurisdiction even though not connected with
official functions. It might be noted, however, that the United States Foreign Service Regulations advise United States diplomatic personnel abroad to the contrary. 4 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF !N.raRNATIONAL LAW §404 (1942).
10 2 HYDE, lNrERNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., §435 (1945), indicates such process is void,
which is the effect of 1 Stat. 117, 22 U.S.C. 252 provisions. See also 4 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF !N.raRNATIONAL LAw §402 (1942).
1 6 As distinguished from official personal property and United Nations' property.
17 Austin v. Royal League, 316 ill. 188, 147 N.E. 106 (1925); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877).
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their judgments directly by transferring title or by placing the wronged party
in possession of the property, and must rely on the relatively inadequate procedure of compelling the defendant to carry out the decree.18 In addition, it
would appear that such in rem proceedings would not interfere with official operations of the United Nations or its member delegations, particularly since any
showing of such interference would presumably constitute a defense to the
action. 19 Whether the in rem exception is rested on a theory of implied waiver
of immunity,20 or on a public policy exception to the general grant of immunity,
it is submitted that it is a more desirable result than to allow the delinquent
tenant or the private debtor to find a safe haven in the legal skirts of the United
Nations' general immunities.21
Allan Neef

18 While there is nothing to prevent an international court from being given in rem
jurisdiction, it is very unlikely that such would ever be done.
19 Even under the court's doctrine, it is to be assumed that official acts and property
are beyond the court's jurisdiction.
20 It might be said that the acquisition of property or a leasehold in an unofficial capacity within the state constitutes an implied agreement not to assert a claim of diplomatic
immunity which will estop the diplomat from denying the local court's jurisdiction in any
matter connected with such property or lease. Implied waiver theories have generally been
looked at by the courts with disfavor, however. 2 HYDE, lNTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed.,
§437 (1945); I OPPENHEIM-LlOTERPACHT, lNTERNATIONAL LAw, 7th ed., 242 (1948).
21 There appears to be no reason why waiver of immunity was not sought from the
Argentine government. It might also be noted that the New York Appellate Division had
earlier held that state courts have no jurisdiction over United Nations personnel. Friedberg v. Santa Cruz, 274 App. Div. 1072, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 369 (1949).

